China\u27s Ten Years by Aarons, Laurie
Laurie
Aarons
CHINA’S 
TEN YEARS
A m em ber of the A ustralian fraternal delegation to  the  
last Congress of the C om m unist Party o f China in 1956, 
advances some ideas on what is happening  to the Chinese 
R evo lu tio n , one of history’s m ost significant events.
O ctober  1, 1956: T ie n  A n M en Square is filled w ith  a m illion 
citizens m arching  or w atching in  e la tion  a t the seventh anniver­
sary of th e ir  R evolution. M ao T se-tung  and  o ther leaders of 
the Chinese C om m unist Party  stand  alongside C om m unist leaders 
from over fifty countries. T h e re  is a sp irit of great optim ism  
and enthusiasm . T h e  ju s t concluded 8 th  Congress has decided 
on a program  of carefully-planned socialist construction. China 
has scored a b rillian t success a t the  B andung Conference, which 
un ited  alm ost all the A froA sian  countries, m any of whose leaders 
are also stand ing  on T ie n  A n M en. T h e  un ity  of the  world 
com m unist m ovem ent has never appeared  so strong. C hairm an 
Mao praised  the Soviet U nion  an d  ind icated  Chinese w illingness 
to learn  from  it and o th e r socialist countries.
O ctober  1, 1966 will be celebrated  in  very different conditions. 
Almost all the m ain decisions of the 8 th  Congress have been 
jettisoned —  and  th a t w ithou t convening ano ther Congress or 
openly sta ting  the reasons for the changes. T h e  ra tio n a l policy 
of socialist economic construction  was replaced by the grandiose 
“great leap”. Correct policies of gradually  raising the quality  
of education according to possibilities and  providing the condi­
tions of tolerance and diversity in  science and  the arts have been 
replaced by the so-called ‘‘g reat p ro le ta rian  cu ltu ra l revo lu tion .” 
This is not p ro le tarian  in  ideological in sp ira tion— it could perhaps 
be regarded as inspired by p rim itive suspicions of science and 
culture, a form  of petty-bourgeois fanaticism . I t  is no t cu ltural 
but obscurantist and  an ti-cu ltural, i t  is no t a revolu tion  b u t a 
degeneration of the revolu tion  and  encouragem ent of conform ism  
miscalled "rebe llion”. Chinese foreign policy, changed beyond
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recognition from  the days of B andung, has led to  an  in ternational 
isolation unbelievable in  1956. T h e  Chinese leaders have placed 
the ir P arty  in  isolation in  the com m unist m ovem ent, too. The 
exaggerated language, absurd  polemics and  subjective policies 
they advance have gradually  a lienated  the  support and even 
sym pathy of Parties h ith e rto  agreeing, in  p a rt a t least, with 
the ir concepts and  ideas.
T h e  Chinese leaders have been the m ost im p o rtan t contribution  
to this themselves, by their s tubborn  and  contem ptuous rejection 
of all appeals for u n ited  action in  support of V ietnam . This 
has shown u p  the stark  fact tha t Chinese d isrup tion  of communist 
un ity  has helped  only U nited  States im perialism , otherwise in 
such d ire  straits in  Asia and  the world. Chinese attacks on the 
Soviet U n ion  over V ietnam  have been in  sharp con trast to  state­
m ents by H o  Chi M inh. T hey  have attacked C uba in  violent 
terms, are a t loggerheads w ith  the Japanese com m unists over the 
peace m ovem ent, and  have an exactly opposite estim ate to  the 
Koreans of the  12th T okyo Conference against A and  H  Bombs. 
An in teresting  confirm ation of this estim ate comes from  Vanguard 
(No. 32, Septem ber) in  an article alm ost certainly by E. F. Hill. 
As sometimes before, he goes even fu rth e r th an  the Chinese are 
prepared  to  go:
“ It is said th a t the Chinese are ‘iso lated’. Yes, if you want 
to Look at the superficial, count heads of countries even amongst 
those who have h ith e rto  supported  C hina, tha t is true. In  the 
ranks of the  C om m unist themselves an  im m ense process of sorting 
ou t is going on .” (T he  w ord C om m unist is in  the singular, by 
m istake probably , yet symbolic. O ne is rem inded  of the old 
verse: T h e  w hole w orld’s queer, ’cep t thee and  me, A nd even 
thee’s a little  queer.)
Changes in  policy are accom panied by no  less significant changes 
in  o ther fields. Some m ain leaders elected by the 8 th  Congress 
have d isappeared  from  the political a rena , w here and  how often 
rem ain ing  a mystery. T h e  Party C o nstitu tion  is flouted— the 
Congress five years overdue; the C en tra l C om m ittee m eeting less 
and  less frequently— four years betw een th e  last two, although it 
should m eet “at least twice a year.” A n increasingly rigid theory 
and  practice is reflected in  jargon and  near-hysteria in  speech and  
w riting, qu ite  opposite to earlier w ritings of M ao Tse-tung and  
to his adm onitions against jargon  (in  Oppose the Party Eight- 
Legged E ssay).
A full-blow n "personality  cu lt” has developed in  C hina. «  
there  has been no  repe tition  of the w orst excesses of the Stalm
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period— as is fervently to be hoped— it is certa in  th a t adu la tion  
of M ao is already far m ore ex trem e— and  absurd— even than  tha t 
lavished u p o n  Stalin. T hese an d  o ther dram atic changes in 
C h ina call ou t for exp lana tion  an d  assessment.
H istoric  event
O ne great fact m ust be grasped: despite all the  mistakes, 
excesses an d  policy shifts m ade by the C om m unist Party , the 
Chinese R evolu tion  is one of the g reat events of o u r  times; it 
has already achieved m uch in  rem aking  C hina and  will achieve still 
more. T h is  revolution  is an objective process w hich w ill in  the 
long ru n  assert the necessity for reversal and  correction of policies. 
C onditions of its h istorical developm ent have laid  an  impress 
upon the Chinese R evo lu tion  a n d  u p o n  the C om m unist Party  
which perform ed such prodigies of self-sacrifice, valor, persistence, 
won such victories and  so creatively developed m arxist-leninist 
theory.
Economic, social and  political conditions of C hina in  the 1920’s 
—themselves a consequence of its long history—confronted  the 
Chinese com m unists w ith  com plex problem s. A big nation , w ith  
enorm ous la ten t pow er, it lay a p rostra te  and  helpless victim  of 
contending E uropean  powers an d  Jap an . A people once am ong 
the w orld ’s most advanced in  industry , technology and  science, had  
dropped  far behind. T h e  foreign powers, com ing for o u trigh t 
plunder, stopped to  explo it th ro u g h  trade and  industria lisation . 
T h e ir  oppression of the Chinese, an d  th e ir  savage rivalry, d isto rted  
social developm ent beyond all bounds. T h e  Chinese people 
suffered this in to lerab le  burden , n o t p a tien tly  as in  the  W estern 
m yth, b u t w ith  an  ever grow ing b itte r  de term ination  to change 
the w hole society.
T hose  young in tellectuals (inevitably  mostly from  the  up p er 
m iddle class) who perceived the p lig h t of the nation  an d  w anted 
to change society, could take only th e  revolu tionary  path . T h e  
death of Sun Yat-sen, the bloody victory of C hiang Kai-shek w ith  
the aid  of the foreign powers, set the m ost determ ined  of these 
upon the  com m unist path . T h e re  was no  o ther way open. Yet 
how could the com m unists w in in  China? R epeated  efforts a t 
p ro le tarian  uprisings in  the  cities, despite incred ib le  heroism , 
were crushed. These uprisings were advised by the C om m unist 
In ternational; S talin phayed a large p a r t in  e labora ting  this advice. 
Efforts to  im pose views upon  the Chinese Party, spring ing  from  
failure to  appreciate  the  specific conditions of C hina and  perhaps 
from  narrow  concern for Russian na tio n a l interests, may have la id  
the foundation  for M aoist suspicion of views of o ther C om m unist
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Parties.* If so, this was com pounded by S ta lin ’s policy on China 
du ring  and  after the Second W orld  W ar. (T his casts serious 
d ou b t on the sincerity of the  Chinese defence of Stalin.)
M ao T se-tung  seriously tackled the g reat and  com plex problems 
of the Chinese R evolution. T h e  strategic po litical and  m ilitary 
concepts he e laborated  in  this herculean task a re  b rillian t examples 
of creative m arxism , the antithesis of doctrinairism  and  rigidity 
(and exam ples of vivid w riting  even in  tra n s la tio n ) . Perhaps the 
essence o f his theory was tha t the peasantry  u n d er pro letarian  
leadership h ad  to be the m ain  force of the Chinese R evolution 
for a variety of reasons— including  the superiority  of the weapons 
of C h iang’s armies and  the foreign forces stationed  in  the cities. 
From  this arose the concept of “encircling the cities from  the 
countryside.”
T h e  Chinese R evolu tion  succeeded in  the course of twenty years 
of civil w ar and  the w ar against Japan . I t  was successful in  the face 
of overw helm ing odds, im placable opposition  from  the U nited 
States and  B ritain , at a b itte r cost in  lives and  suffering. I t  was also 
successful in  face of advice from  foreign com m unists, a lthough by 
no m eans w ithou t assistance, includ ing  the A id for C hina move­
m ent in A ustralia  and the struggle to  stop export of iron  to Japan.
US responsibility
T h e  m ain  single external con trib u tio n  to w hat has happened 
has been the US policy of active hostility  to  C h ina w hich has 
continued  and  developed u n til today it is the m ain  th reat to 
world peace. T h is b itte r US hostility  is a reaction expressing 
the rage of an  expanding  US m onopoly capitalism , in tox icated  with 
dream s of w orld suprem acy and  counting  upon  the huge stim ulus 
of the exp lo ita tion  of cheap labor, rich  n a tu ra l resources and 
massive m arket for the export of cap ita l supplied  by a country 
larger in  area than  the USA and  a p o p u la tio n  one-fourth of 
hum anity . T h e  course of events since 1956 has been greatly 
influenced by the fateful US option  for an  active anti-China 
policy of isolation, aggression and a ttem pted  hum ilia tion . This 
policy has already failed, and  has rebounded  upon  the Americans, 
who have added to th e ir o ther crimes the grave responsibility  for 
co n trib u tin g  m uch to recent developm ents in  C hinese policy. It
* Further light on this can be obtained in Resolution on Some Questions in 
the History o f Our Party (Vol. IV. Selected W orks o f M ao Tse-tung, p  171, 
Lawrence and W ishart.—Ed.). The Wang Ming criticised in this resolution was 
Chinese representative in the Comintern, who returned to China and influenced 
what Mao calls the “T hird Left Line’’.
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is a little  la te  for Johnson  to  speak in  vague generalities abou t 
w an ting  a settlem ent w ith  C hina.
T h e  A m erican anti-C hina policy is followed by H olt, acting 
fo r the  decisive groups in  th e  A ustra lian  ru lin g  class. I t  is their 
m ain  justification for “A ll the W ay w ith  L B J”, for V ietnam  and  the 
decline in  living standards, w hether p u t in  the refined accents 
o f a H asluck o r the crude ro a r  of the recru it instructor: “G et 
those slant-eyed yellow bastards before they get you."
T hose  level-headed A ustralians w ho can see the national in terest 
th rough  the haze of racialist anti-com m unism  will oppose this 
crim inal policy, and  seek to develop the  already-significant trade 
re la tions to a national policy of friendsh ip  w ith  C hina. A ustralian  
com m unists w ill be to the fore in  this p a trio tic  task, w hile m aking 
the ir position  clear on those issues on  w hich they differ from  the 
Chinese leadership. T h is  is no t always easy, since statem ents from  
C hina sometimes lend superficial coloring to  the otherw ise absurd 
black-white caricatures of the hard-line gang now in  control of 
A ustralian  foreign policy.
D espite its own words, however, the Chinese leadership rem ains 
cautious in  action, calcu lating  an d  shrewd in  analysis of power 
realities. I t  so far retains the com m unist standpo in t th a t im per­
ialism  rem ains the source of w ar, and  th a t w orld peace can be 
m ain ta ined  only by opposing im perialism . T h e  divergence occurs 
on estim ation of the possibility of p reventing  world w ar—which 
in  words a t least the Chinese estim ate a t alm ost zero— and the 
m ethods of struggle for peace. T h e re  is no danger of C hina 
declaring war on, invading o r bom bing  the U n ited  States; neither 
desire nor possibility are present. O n the o ther hand , A m erican 
planes have flown over and  bom bed C hina; the U nited  States has 
the m ilita ry  po ten tia l to invade C hina (though no  chance of 
w inning  the war this w ould in a u g u ra te ) . Some im portan t Ame­
rican m ilitary  and  political forces have openly advocated this 
course. T h e  Chinese leadership, for its p art, does no t help  the 
cause of w orld peace, o r its friends, by exaggerated ta lk  of 
“w elcom ing” an A m erican invasion.
T h e  fight against the th rea tened  US aggression against C hina, 
for the  reversal of C h in a’s exclusion from  the U n ited  N ations 
and  the w orld com m unity, is v ita l for w orld peace and especially 
relevant to the struggle for an  in d ependen t A ustralian  foreign 
policy. T h e re  is a special significance for all C om m unist Parties 
in  w aging this struggle, since it  m ay well prove one of the paths 
towards restoration  of the u n ity  of the m ovem ent. R igh tly  or
I
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w rongly— I believe w rongly a lthough  n o t com pletely w ithou t some 
subjective cause— the Chinese feel th a t th e ir  special position has 
n o t been always considered by o ther socialist countries, particularly  
the USSR.
A re they com m unists?
T h e re  is some discussion am ong A ustra lian  com m unists— and, 
it may be, elsewhere, too— about w hether the Chinese Party 
leadership can still be regarded as com m unist, or at w hat point 
th e ir  d ep a rtu re  from  m arxist-leninist positions and  behaviour 
would call this in to  question. T h is w rite r believes th a t the answer 
can only be: Yes, they are com m unists, even though  th e ir political 
positions are wrong, dam aging the cause of com m unism . They 
are com m unists whose com m unism  is influenced strongly by 
Chinese trad itio n  an d  natio n a l p ride, the  la tte r  swollen by their 
great achievem ents, and  no t least by the  alm ost mystic belief of 
M ao T se-tung  in  his own “ though t.” .
T h o u g h  the  experiences of the S talin  era , am ong o ther examples, 
w arn of the need to avoid crude over-sim plification of the  re la tion­
ship betw een base and  superstructure, C h ina  is a socialist country 
so long as the econom ic structure  of C h ina  rem ains collectively 
owned, an d  its m ovem ent is tow ards construction  of socialism. It 
is difficult to  detect any evidence of, o r  p robab le  trend  towards, 
re tu rn  to  cap italist p roduction  relations. I t  is no m ore valid 
to w ipe aside this fact because of deep ideological differences with 
the Chinese, th an  for the  Chinese to  claim  to discern a re tu rn  to 
capitalism  in  the USSR. Perhaps, in  the  long ru n , this basic fact 
provides the foundation  for qualified optim ism .
T h e  in te rn a l and  deep-lying social causes for the spasmodic 
character of Chinese policies, as d istin c t from  th e ir ideological 
and  psychological reflections, are to  be found  in  the  complex 
problem s of industria lisa tion  of th e ir  huge country, w ith  at least 
500 m illion  liv ing in  ru ra l areas an d  depend ing  upon  peasant 
ag ricu ltu ra l m ethods, even w ith  a form  of collectivisation. T he 
1958 “great leap ” was an  effort to  ju m p  over a w hole historical 
stage. I t  called fo rth  trem endous enthusiasm , setting  as the  goal 
a v ictorious en try  in to  fully-fledged com m unist society before the 
Soviet U n ion , by the pow er of ideology an d  w ithou t the patien t 
and even tedious w ork of creating  a large-scale m odern  industry 
or needing  to  m aster science and technology.* Now, there is 
reason to expect some new v arian t of the  “great leap” .
* T his displays only hindsight, since I was convinced and enthused by the 
Great Leap which I  saw in its genesis in 1958, backyard steel furnaces, incred­
ible crop yields and all.
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I t m ay seem contradictory  to  foreshadow a possible new  “great 
leap” follow ing the “p ro le ta rian  cu ltu ra l revo lu tion” and  yet to  
speak of (even a long range) optim ism  fo r re tu rn  to  scientific 
m arxism . Yet it  is possible th a t, given the present political an d  
ideological line, the only way to  re tu rn  to ra tionality  lies in  fu ther 
experience of the  fu tility  of such subjective in te rn a l econom ic po li­
cies, particu larly  when this is added  to the  reverses in  Chinese 
foreign relations on bo th  state an d  P arty  levels.
R eports of w idespread opposition  w ith in  the C om m unist Party  
to the “R ed G u ard ” excesses are significant, com ing as they do 
from  official Chinese sources. I t  w ould, however, be a m istake 
to swallow whole the press speculation  th a t the “R ed G u ard ” is 
replacing the C om m unist Party , o r is being b u ilt up  as an  a lte rn a­
tive; the R ed  G uard  is firmly con tro lled  by the d o m in an t Party  
leadership un d er L in  P iac
B ut there is enough h a rd  evidence to  show th a t there has been 
long-standing opposition to recen t M aoist policies on all fronts— 
economic, m ilitary, political, cu ltu ra l. Its  persistence reveals a 
firm social basis for this opposition , w hich cannot easily be dismissed 
or regarded as “rem nants of the  bourgeoisie.” I t  is far m ore likely 
th a t this basis is to be found  in  the im p o rtan t and grow ing indus­
trial w orking class, an d  the scientists, technicians and  academics 
d irectly o r indirectly  associated w ith  large-scale production .
I t  w ould be a gross over-sim plification and  determ inism , as well 
as po litical naivete, to believe these econom ic conditions w ill 
result in  sm ooth rectification of incorrect policies. U ndoubtedly , 
ideological and  political changes are decisive in  the assertion 
of these social forces. T h is  is possible only w ith in  Chinese society 
— and w ith in  its C om m unist Party .
C om m unists of o ther countries can only do the ir best to assist 
this inev itab le process by acting  to  th e ir u tm ost pow er upon  the 
ex ternal conditions w hich influence C h in a’s developm ent— th a t is, 
•he struggle against im perialist hostility  and  US encirclem ent, 
and  by con tinu ing  p a tien t efforts for u n ity  w ith in  the m ovem ent, 
includ ing  w ith  the  Chinese Party . T h is  la tte r requires patience, 
ability  to resist provocations an d  endure  insult, w hile m aking 
reasoned criticism s of w hat they regard  as the m ost im portan t 
differences w ith  the Chinese stand.
A ustralian  com m unists w ill try to m ake th e ir m odest con tribu tion .
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